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TAGS: [PARM](#) [IR](#) [UNSC](#) [MNUC](#) [ETTC](#) [KNNP](#)  
SUBJECT: IRAN COMMITTEE LETTERS DELIVERED (WITH DIFFICULTY)  
TO IRAN AND SYRIA

Classified By: Amb. Alex Wolff for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

11. (C) SUMMARY: The UN Security Council's Iran Sanctions Committee has approved letters to Iran and Syria regarding the transfer of arms-related materiel on the Cypriot-flagged ship Monchegorsk. The letters state clearly that this transfer was in violation of Security Council resolution 1747 and requested further information on the transaction within ten working days. The Japanese Perm Rep, chair of the Iran Sanctions Committee, tried unsuccessfully to hand-deliver the letters to the Iran and Syrian UN missions. The Syrian Perm Rep refused to accept a letter that was "inaccurate" and the Iranian mission abruptly canceled a meeting to receive its letter. The Japanese mission eventually faxed the letters to the respective missions. The Iranian UN mission later complained to the Japanese that it would be difficult to produce a reply within the allotted timeframe. END SUMMARY.

12. (C) On March 9, the UN Security Council's Iran Sanctions Committee (1737 Committee) formally approved letters to be sent to Iran and Syria requesting additional relevant information regarding arms-related materiel found on the Cypriot-flagged vessel M/V Monchegorsk. The letter stated clearly that the transfer of this cargo from Iran to Syria was in violation of paragraph five of resolution 1747 (2007), which prohibits the transfer of such materiel from Iran and its procurement by other states. The Committee requested from Iran and Syria responses in writing within ten working days (e.g., by Monday March 23).

13. (C) Japanese Perm Rep Takasu intended to hand-deliver these letters to representatives from the Iran and Syria UN missions, as he believed that a face-to-face meeting would send a positive signal of engagement and allow him to provide additional explanation and context. However, the Japanese mission has told USUN privately that Iran and Syria were both generally hostile and rebuffed Takasu's attempts to hand-deliver the letters.

14. (C) According to the Japanese, Takasu scheduled a meeting with the Syrian Perm Rep on March 9 to present the letter. Takasu walked through the text of the letter and explained that the Committee was particularly interested in knowing details about the origin and ownership of the cargo, in particular whether cargo might belong to individuals or entities designated under the Iran sanctions resolutions. The Syrian Perm Rep responded angrily that he was not happy with some of the wording in the letter. He asserted that the Iran sanctions resolutions were only concerned with nuclear-related issues and asked Takasu rhetorically whether the Committee was implying there was nuclear material in the cargo. Saying that he could not receive a letter that is "not accurate," the Syrian Perm Rep requested that Takasu ask the Iran Sanctions Committee to redraft the letter to delete various unacceptable elements. Takasu demurred. The Perm

Rep then said he would only receive the letter if sent by "official route," as opposed to being hand delivered. The Japanese mission later faxed the letter to the Syrian mission and sent via courier a signed copy of the original.

15. (C) The Japanese mission related an even stranger interaction with the Iranians. The Japanese had successfully scheduled a meeting at Deputy Perm Rep-level to hand over the letter, but when the Japanese Perm Rep arrived the Iranians complained that he was "three minutes late" and said that the Iranian Deputy Perm Rep had suddenly been called away to other business. A lower-level Iranian official said that because he had no instructions to accept the letter by hand, he could not receive it. The Japanese subsequently faxed the letter to the Iranian mission.

16. (C) The Iranian Deputy Perm Rep called the Japanese back the next day (March 10) saying the Iranians were "now ready for a meeting." The Japanese Deputy Perm Rep repeated Takasu's points about the Committee being interested in the ownership, origin and final destination of the cargo. The Iranian Deputy Perm Rep complained that Iran has a "long holiday" coming up and that it would be difficult for the Iranian government to produce a response within the allotted timeframe. The Japanese Deputy Perm Rep, who is a Middle East expert, noted that the Iranian bureaucracy is the most efficient in the region and could surely generate a timely response.

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